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bstract
irms are established by entrepreneurs, and entrepreneurship is typically embodied within a firm. And yet, the research literatures on entrepreneur-
hip and the theory of the firm developed mostly independently. I suggest some reasons why these literatures have struggled to connect, and offer potential path forward, one that describes the entrepreneurial act as the acquisition, combination, and recombination of heterogeneous resources
nder conditions of uncertainty.
 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublished by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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The research literature on the economic theory of the firm
as been around since the 1930s (Coase, 1937), blossoming
ully into a distinct research program during the 1970s with
he seminal works of Williamson (1971, 1975, 1979), Alchian
nd Demsetz (1972), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Holmström
1979), and many others. This story has been told many times
e.g., Foss & Klein, 2012, chapter 6) and chapters on the “theory
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hese theories focus on the benefits and costs of organizing,
anaging, and governing transactions [sometimes to the neglect
f production costs (Langlois & Foss, 1999)] under various
onditions. These perspectives have spawned a large set of theo-
etical and empirical applications, extensions, and refinements,
nd increasingly use the language and style of contemporary for-
al economics (e.g., Aghion, Dewatripont, Legros, & Zingales,
016).
And yet, there is much less work in this tradition explaining
he emergence  of the firm.1 Where do firms come from? Most are
stablished by entrepreneurs, and indeed, the most common def-
nition of “entrepreneur” for academics and practitioners is “one
ho forms a new business organization.” One would then think
hat entrepreneurship theory would be part of the theory of the
rm. Put differently, entrepreneurs are individuals who estab-
ish, operate, reconfigure, dissolve, and otherwise work through
rms; hence economic theories of the firm – as well as theories of
he firm drawn from psychology, sociology, operations research,
nd so on – might be considered applications of entrepreneurship
heory. Alas, neither is true; for the entrepreneurship field has
ts own research literature, largely divorced from the literatures
n firm organization and firm strategy. The entrepreneurship
1 A recent exception is Bylund (2015).
istrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP. Published
p://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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iterature focuses mostly on individuals, not organizations, and
n firm creation, not firm operation.2
Much of my own recent work on entrepreneurship (see
lein, 2017) can be understood as a call to bring entrepreneur-
hip into the theory of the firm, and the theory of the firm
nto entrepreneurship. Contemporary entrepreneurship research
evolves around the concept of the “opportunity” (largely
ased on the work of economist Israel Kirzner).3 In this
pproach, entrepreneurship research asks why, when and how (1)
ntrepreneurial opportunities arise, (2) certain individuals and
rms and not others discover and exploit opportunities, and (3)
ifferent modes of action are used to exploit those opportunities
Shane & Venkataraman, 2000: 218). The opportunity-discovery
pproach has spawned an ambitious and sweeping research pro-
ram on the nature and implications of opportunities and their
elationship to individual and market characteristics.
During the last decade, however, the opportunity-discovery
pproach has been challenged on ontological, epistemic, and
ethodological grounds. Alvarez and Barney (2007) argued
hat opportunities do not always exist objectively “out there,”
ut must be created by entrepreneurial action. The “effectuation
pproach,” building on cognitive science and associated in par-
icular with the work of Sarasvathy (2008), sees entrepreneurs
ot as discovering (or creating) profit opportunities, then taking
ctions to exploit those opportunities, but as acting experimen-
ally, incrementally, and with limited foresight, taking advantage
f resources currently at hand – what is often described as “brico-
age” (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Garud & Karnøe, 2003).
A third challenge to the opportunity-discovery view, build-
ng on Cantillon (1755), Knight (1921), Mises (1949), and
asson (1982), questions the very notion of opportunities, find-
ng the opportunity metaphor redundant at best, misleading at
orse. My recent book, Organizing  Entrepreneurial  Judgment:
 New  Theory  of  the  Firm  (Foss & Klein, 2012), is dedicated to
econstructing, elaborating, and extending this “judgment-based
iew.” In this approach, entrepreneurship is conceptualized as
udgmental decision-making which takes place in a market set-
ing under uncertainty. Entrepreneurs combine heterogeneous
ssets, which differ in their attributes, and deploy these assets
ithin a firm to the production of new offerings that may satisfy
ustomer wants at a profit. Rather than pursuing metaphorical
pportunities – which are only realized ex post, after profits and
osses are realized – entrepreneurs pursue profits, and try to avoid
osses, by anticipating future market conditions. And they do so
y establishing, organizing, and reorganizing business firms.
ntrepreneurial  judgmentThe judgment-based view is part of a larger stream of research
eeking to make action, not opportunities, the unit of analysis for
2 Recent work on “strategic entrepreneurship” (Klein, Barney, & Foss, 2013)
as begun to apply entrepreneurial concepts, tools, and methods to established
rms, but adds little to conventional (transaction cost, agency theoretic, or prop-
rty rights) explanations of firm existence, boundaries, and internal organization.
3 See Klein and Bylund (2014) for a discussion of Kirzner’s influence on the
eld.
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ntrepreneurship research (Holcombe, Michael Holmes, Klein,
 Duane Ireland, 2014; Klein, 2008; McMullen & Shepherd,
006). The term judgment  comes from Knight (1921), who
escribed judgment as decision-making under un-certainty that
annot be modeled or parameterized as a set of formal decision
ules. Judgment is midway between the “rational decision-
aking” of neoclassical economics models and blind luck or
andom guessing. We sometimes call it intuition, gut feeling, or
nderstanding. In a world of Knightian uncertainty, and hetero-
eneous capital resources with attributes that are subjectively
erceived and unknowable ex ante, some agency must bear the
esponsibility of owning, controlling, deploying, and redeploy-
ng these resources in the service of consumer wants. That, in
he judgment-based perspective, is the role of the entrepreneur.
he entrepreneur’s job is to combine and recombine heteroge-
eous capital resources in pursuit of profit (and the avoidance of
oss). When the entrepreneur is successful in acquiring resources
t prices below their realized marginal revenue products – i.e.,
hen the entrepreneur exercises good judgment – she earns an
conomic profit. When her judgments are poor, she earns an
conomic loss. Competition among entrepreneurs (and those
ho provide financial capital to entrepreneurs) tends to steer
wnership and control of productive resources toward those
ntrepreneurs with better judgment.
Unlike other approaches to entrepreneurship, the judgment-
ased view closely links entrepreneurship to ownership and
conomic organization. Knight (1921, p. 271) argued that judg-
ental decision-making is inseparable from responsibility and
ontrol, that is, ownership and direction of a business venture.
The essence of enterprise is the specialization of the function
f responsible direction of economic life.  .  .Any degree of effec-
ive exercise of judgment, or making decisions, is in a free
ociety coupled with a corresponding degree of uncertainty-
earing, of taking the responsibility for those decisions.” Hence
ntrepreneurs own assets, and entrepreneurial action is manifest
n firms.
Foss and Klein (2015) offer a summary of the judgment-based
iew and respond to some criticisms and concerns. One problem
s that the theory is largely agnostic about the exact cognitive
nd psychological mechanisms underlying entrepreneurial judg-
ent. For explaining firm existence, boundaries, and internal
tructure, a general, abstract conception of judgment may suf-
ce. But there may be gains to a more systematic treatment of
ecision-making under uncertainty, following thinkers such as
hackle (Packard, Clark, & Klein, 2016) or Bayesian decision
odels (Bewley, 1986, 1989). Another issue as that “judgment,”
s the act of making decisions under uncertainty, is often con-
used with the ordinary-language meaning of judgment, which
onnotes wisdom, discernment, or discretion. Judgment per se,
s we use the term, is different from “good judgment.” Of
ourse, given market competition, entrepreneurs who systemat-
cally make good judgments will tend to prosper at the expense
f those who tend to make poor judgments, so there is a link
etween judgment per se and good judgment. But the potentially
mbiguous nature of the term “judgment” has led to some unnec-
ssary confusion (e.g., Foss & Klein, 2012: 95–96; Sarasvathy
 Dew, 2013).
inist
J
o
“
a
e
j
o
o
c
f
e
i
t
c
s
f
a
a
b
t
b
t
a
m
j
e
s
(
i
e
a
(
h
s
o
A
t
p
s
s
2
A
s
n
M
S
a
a
c
g
u
m
a
t
a
i
a
c
g
e
t
fi
t
C
R
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
F
F
F
F
G
G
HP.G. Klein / Revista de Adm
udgment  and  ﬁrm  existence,  boundaries,  and  internal
rganization
How does the judgment-based approach help us deal with the
classic” Coasean questions about firm emergence, boundaries,
nd internal organization? First, as Knight (1921) pointed out,
ntrepreneurial judgment is non-contractible. In other words, if
udgment represents residual decision authority about the use
f productive assets, then judgment cannot be delegated with-
ut selling the asset. An entrepreneur-owner can seek advice, of
ourse, but bears the ultimate responsibility for soliciting advice,
ollowing or rejecting advice, and making final decisions. To
xercise judgment, then, the entrepreneur must be an owner –
.e., must start and/or operate a firm. Put differently, a prospec-
ive entrepreneur (or team of entrepreneurs) may be unable to
ommunicate expectations about a project or business plan – a
pecific way of combining heterogeneous capital assets to serve
uture consumer wants – in such a way that other agents can
ssess its economic implications. Organizing a firm may also be
 low-cost means of experimentation with different asset com-
inations and employment contracts, under the coordination of
he entrepreneur (Foss, 2001). The existence of the firm can thus
e explained by a specific category of transaction costs, namely,
hose that close the market for entrepreneurial judgment.
In this approach, a firm is an entrepreneur plus the alienable
ssets she owns and controls. The multi-person firm includes
ultiple owners and/or employees who may exercise “derived
udgment” on the part of the entrepreneur-owner or owners, who
xercise judgment in selecting, monitoring, and delegating deci-
ion authority to these employees. Organizational characteristics
size, vertical boundaries, diversification, ownership structure,
nternal organization, etc.) evolve over time as entrepreneurs
xperiment with different combinations of heterogeneous assets
nd different strategies and business models. As Lachmann
1956: 16) put it, “We are living in a world of unexpected change;
ence capital combinations.  . .will be ever changing, will be dis-
olved and reformed. In this activity, we find the real function
f the entrepreneur.”
dvancing  the  theory
Ongoing and future research on entrepreneurship and the
heory of the firm fits into several categories. First, several
apers seek to operationalize entrepreneurial judgment more
pecifically in the context of economic organization and firm
trategy (Foss et al., 2016; Godley & Casson, 2015; Halberg,
015; McCaffrey, 2015; McMullen, 2015; Packard et al., 2016).
nother stream look at applications of the judgment-based per-
pective to innovation, public policy, corporate governance,
on-market action, and more (Klein, McGahan, Pitelis, &
ahoney, 2010; Kolympiris & Klein, 2016; McCaffrey &
alerno, 2011). Economists and other social scientists tend to
pply entrepreneurial metaphors too loosely, referring to cre-
tive and innovative persons as “entrepreneurs” without fully
onsidering the differences in institutional context (for example,
overnment bureaucrats are investing other people’s resources
nder conditions of uncertainty, not their own resources). But we
Hração 51 (2016) 323–326 325
ay be able to gain some insight on the behavior of non-market
ctors, and the emergence and growth of public organizations, by
hinking about entrepreneurial processes of resource assembly
nd recombination.
The theory of the firm, in turn, can benefit further by think-
ng more systematically about firm emergence, how firms adapt
nd respond to economic change, and how established firms
an be more entrepreneurial and innovative. Doing so requires
oing beyond the production-function approach to the firm, and
ven beyond the transaction cost, property-rights, and agency-
heoretic perspectives that dominate the modern theory of the
rm. This will help the scholarly community exploit more fully
he potential gains from trade between these two fields.
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